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Abstract
Significant employment differences between the US and Europe are concentrated
among young workers. This paper constructs a labor search model that accounts for
age patterns of employment. Work experience reduces the probability that workers lose
their jobs. By introducing minimum wages, the model explains empirical findings on
the effects of minimum wage laws. In addition, the model shows that minimum wages
can account for about half of the differences in youth employment between Europe and
the United States.
∗Preliminary, comments welcome. Previously circulated under the title: “Labor Market Connections,
Minimum Wages, and Youth Employment.” I would like to thank Galina Hale, Lee Lockwood, Derek Neal,
Ezra Oberfield, Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer, Nancy Stokey, participants of the Capital Theory Working
Group at the University of Chicago, the 2008 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society,
the 2008 SED Summer Meetings, and the 12th Annual SCIIE International Economics Conference for helpful
comments. All mistakes are my own.
1 Introduction
Why do people in Europe work less than people in the United States? Most of the existing
literature explains aggregate time series data by focusing on the effects of labor market poli-
cies on a representative worker. This framework overlooks several sources of heterogeneity in
work decisions both across individuals and for a given individual at different ages. Hetero-
geneity across age is particularly important in explaining differences in labor supply across
countries. Figure 1 plots employment to population ratios in 2000 for five age bands for the
US, Canada, France, Portugal and Spain1. The difference in European employment relative
to the United States is concentrated in the 15-24 and 55-64 year old age groups. While
a compelling literature has examined retirement policies and unemployment insurance to
understand the differences in retirement across countries, not much work has been done to
understand the even larger employment differences among young workers. To fully explain
employment differences across countries the observed patterns of employment among young
workers must be accounted for.
Minimum wages provide a potential explanation of large employment differences among
young workers across countries. In the United States, minimum wages have been low and
declined in real value over time until recent increases starting in 2007. Many European
countries have had much higher levels of minimum wages2. This paper quantitatively assesses
1Data is total male and female employment in each age group divided by the population in that age group
from the OECD Corporate Data Environment Labor Market Statistics Database. Further discussion of the
data and time series evidence is presented in the appendix.
2Evidence on minimum wages over time is presented in the appendix. Most countries have consistently
higher minimum wages than the US. France has had dramatic increases in the minimum wage since 1960
compared to a decline in the US value.
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Figure 1: Average employment to population ratio by age in 2000.
how much of the differences in youth employment across countries in 2000 can be accounted
for by differences in minimum wage policy.
A model that accounts for the age heterogeneity in employment outcomes is needed to
evaluate the effects of minimum wages. This paper constructs a search model to explain the
pattern of employment for young workers. To generate lower levels of youth employment
workers are one of two types: experienced and inexperienced. Workers enter the labor force
inexperienced without a job and while employed can become experienced. The key assump-
tion is that experienced workers separate from their jobs at a lower rate. This exogenous
decline is used to calibrate the model so that it is consistent with the observed decline in job
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separation rates with age in the US economy3. The model assumes both types of workers
draw jobs from the same productivity distribution. However, experienced workers have a
higher reservation productivity level which leads to differences in job finding rates and wages
between groups. The model matches the age employment patterns for young workers in the
United States.
The model exploits the observed decline in job separation rates with age in the data to
generate differences in outcomes for young workers. While the model treats the decline as
exogenous, there are many possible explanations for the observed decline in separations. Neal
(1999) argues that young workers first match with a career before searching for a job within
a profession. This entails workers trying many jobs in order to find what they are good at.
Once a worker finds a suitable profession, it is reasonable to think that she would be less
likely to quit or be fired. Jovanovic (1979) constructs a learning model where workers sort
themselves into better jobs that have lower rates of separation. Gorry (2010) extends this
learning model so that workers with more experience are better at distinguishing between
good and bad jobs. Older experienced workers are able to select into jobs that are likely
to have longer durations. Other possible explanations include job training and on-the-job-
search (see Mortensen (1988)). Any of these models can provide a micro level explanation
for the decline in separation rates used in this paper.
3One potential concern with this approach is that separation rates are not invariant to changes in the
minimum wage. However, in models with endogenous separations like Jovanovic (1979) and Gorry (2010)
minimum wages increase the job separation rate and hence the employment effects of minimum wages. This
approach provides a convenient lower bound for the observed employment effects of minimum wages. While
providing an endogenous explanation of the decline in separation rates is of interest, the goal of this paper
is to quantitatively assess the effects of minimum wages on labor market outcomes.
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To assess the impact of minimum wages the model is simulated for levels of minimum
wages and tax policy found in each country. This exercise focuses on individuals who enter
directly into the labor market, abstracting away from potentially important differences in
education. Adding minimum wages implies that these representative inexperienced workers
have a more difficult time finding their first job and are less likely to become experienced.
These negative effects decline with age as workers become experienced and the minimum
wage no longer binds. The quantitative exercise suggests that minimum wages can account
for about 50% of employment differences for young workers between the US and France and
Portugal.
This paper relates to two major literatures. First, it complements the literature that
attempts to explain employment differences between the US and Europe. Rogerson (2006)
lays out a research agenda to quantitatively assess the impact of various labor market insti-
tutions on employment outcomes. While previous work focuses on explaining employment
differences between the US and Europe, this paper studies factors that can explain why
the differences are concentrated among young workers. Prescott (2004) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) present two leading explanations for the differences in employment between
the United States and Europe. Prescott (2004) concludes that differences in hours worked
between the United States and Europe are accounted for by differences in labor tax rates
across countries. While the representative agent model predicts a decline in total hours
worked from higher taxes, it does not take a stand on which margin of work hours adjust.
There are no implications from Prescott’s (2004) model as to whether differences in hours
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are at the extensive or intensive margin or how these differences vary with age. Using linear
taxes in a life-cycle model Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) show that an increase in taxes
causes a decrease in both hours of work over the life-cycle and a decline in employment early
and late in life. However, it is unclear if the life-cycle model quantitatively accounts for
differences in employment across countries. Additionally, including progressive rather than
flat taxes may reduce the decline in the extensive margin in favor of larger decreases on the
intensive margin.
In a completing explanation, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) show that the combination of
lost human capital when unemployed and generous unemployment compensation causes the
longer unemployment durations found in Europe. They argue that increases in job turnover
rates since the 1970s caused European economies with large unemployment benefits to expe-
rience increases in unemployment. This channel is consistent with a decline in employment
for older workers who have accumulated human capital, but does not account for the decline
in youth employment.
Second, there is a large literature that studies the effects of minimum wages on labor
market outcomes. For a good survey of the literature see Neumark and Wascher (2007).
This paper provides theoretical support for findings in the empirical literature about the
effects of minimum wages on employment outcomes. It explains why the effects of minimum
wages are only found among young workers. Moreover, the impact of minimum wages on
employment is non-linear; low levels of minimum wages have little effect where high minimum
wages cause much lower youth employment rates. This reconciles the literature that finds
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small effects of minimum wage laws in the United States where minimum wages are low with
the literature that finds larger effects in Europe.
Flinn (2006) and Rocheteau and Tasci (2008) study the effects of minimum wages in
equilibrium search models. Minimum wages are introduced in this paper in the same way
as in Flinn (2006) who considers the efficiency of minimum wages for different bargaining
environments. Unlike Flinn (2006), this paper assumes that the Hosios (1990) condition
applies, so that the equilibrium is efficient. This paper extends the simple search framework
to explore the cross-country implications of minimum wages on employment outcomes for
young workers.
The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 calibrates the model to match the age
patterns of employment found in the US. Section 4 documents the predictions from the
model and section 5 uses the model to quantitatively assess employment outcomes between
the US and several European countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes the search and matching model that can mimic the age patterns found
in employment. The model extends the matching models of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
and Pissarides (1985) by allowing employed workers to become experienced. Experienced
workers are less likely to become separated from their jobs. This feature enables the model
to generate differences in employment outcomes between young and older workers. While
experience makes jobs last longer, experienced and inexperienced workers still draw job offers
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from the same fixed underlying productivity distribution F (y). Although equilibrium in this
environment will entail a stationary distribution of experienced and inexperienced workers,
the model can be simulated to generate hypothetical employment histories for individual
workers that can be compared to data on employment outcomes.
2.1 Agents
There is a unit mass of workers who exit the labor market at rate δ. A new cohort of size
δ enter the labor force at each date to replace the workers who have left. Hence, there is
a constant number of workers alive at any given time. New workers enter the labor market
inexperienced and unemployed. Workers have preferences:
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)tctdt
where ct is consumption. Agents supply labor to the market inelastically when they are
employed.
Additionally, there is a continuum of infinitely lived agents that will be called firms with
preferences: ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtctdt
Firms search separately for inexperienced and experienced workers and can post any number
of vacancies, vt ∈ N0, at a flow cost of ki consumption units for an open vacancy of type
i ∈ {e, n} where e denotes experienced and n denotes inexperienced workers.
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2.2 Production
Production occurs when a worker is paired with a firm. Experienced and inexperienced work-
ers have separate constant returns to scale matching functions: me(ve, ue) and mn(vn, un)
4.
A worker of type i ∈ {e, n} meets a vacant job at rate λi = mi/ui. Symmetrically, an open
vacancy of type i meets a worker at rate qi = mi/vi. The standard boundary conditions are
assumed: limv/u→∞ λi = 1, limv/u→∞ qi = 0, limv/u→0 λi = 0, and limv/u→0 qi = 1.
When a worker and vacancy of either type meet, the pair draw a match specific productiv-
ity y from distribution F (y). Both workers and firms immediately observe the productivity
draw. Given the productivity y both parties agree on whether to form a match and use
Nash-bargaining to split the surplus. As is standard in the matching literature, the solution
to this problem consists of a reservation productivity level for each type of worker. These
reservation productivities are denoted by y∗e and y
∗
n for experienced and inexperienced work-
ers. If a match is formed, wages are determined by Nash bargaining with weight θ given to
the workers. This will result in wage functions we(y) and wn(y) that depend on the type of
worker in the match.
4Alternately, both experienced and inexperienced workers could draw jobs from the same matching func-
tion. The baseline version of the model calibrates the matching rate to be identical between the two types of
workers. Two matching functions allow changes in minimum wages to alter the job offer rates for different
types of workers as experienced workers become more profitable. This allows another potential channel
whereby labor market policies can affect employment outcomes. While similar results can be generated
by calibrating a model with a single matching function, such models generate a potential multiplicity of
equilibria.
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2.3 Equilibrium
Workers in the model can be in any one of four possible states. The value functions for
unemployed inexperienced, unemployed experienced, employed inexperienced and employed
experienced workers are as follows:
(r + δ)Un = λn
∫
max {En(y)− Un, 0} dF (y) (1)
(r + δ)Ue = λe
∫
max {Ee(y)− Ue, 0} dF (y) (2)
(r + δ)En(y) = wn(y) + p [max {Ee(y), Ue} − En(y)] + sn [Un − En(y)] (3)
(r + δ)Ee(y) = we(y) + se [Ue − Ee(y)] (4)
Unemployed workers are matched with firms at rate λi. When matched they get a draw
from the productivity distribution F (y) and either become employed with productivity y
or remain unemployed. Employed inexperienced workers are paid a wage wn(y) based on
their productivity y. Additionally, they separate from their job and become unemployed
inexperienced at exogenous rate sn and become experienced at rate p. When employed
inexperienced workers becomes experienced they can choose either to become employed
experienced with productivity y or they can quit and become unemployed experienced to
search for a higher productivity match. Finally, employed experienced workers get paid wc(y)
and become unemployed experienced at rate se < sn. Note that becoming experienced is an
absorbing state: experienced workers remain so until they leave the labor force.
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Next, firms can choose to open vacancies for either experienced or inexperienced workers.
Their value functions for inexperienced and experienced vacancies and filled jobs are as
follows:
rVn = −kn + qn
∫
max{Jn(y)− Vn, 0}dF (Y ) (5)
rVe = −ke + qe
∫
max{Je(y)− Ve, 0}dF (Y ) (6)
(r+δ)Jn(y) = y−(1+τ)wn(y)+sn[Vn−Jn(y)]+p[IStay(Je(y)−Jn(y))+(1−IStay)(Vn−Jn(y))]
(7)
(r + δ)Je(y) = y − (1 + τ)we(y) + se[Ve − Je(y)] (8)
If a firm posts a vacancy for an inexperienced worker, it pays a flow cost kn for having
the open vacancy and meets a worker with probability qn. When the match occurs the
firm decides to establish a job or remain as a vacancy depending on the realization of the
productivity draw. Experienced vacancies are identical except that they pay flow cost ke.
The flow costs of vacancies may differ in the two markets either due to the type of work
requiring more capital to be ready for an individual to start work or higher costs in seeking a
more specific type of employee. The firm with an inexperienced worker gets the output from
the match y less the wage and payroll taxes paid to employ the worker (1 + τ)wn(y). The
match dissolves at rate sn. At rate p the worker becomes experienced. If the worker keeps her
job the match becomes experienced, otherwise the firm and worker separate. Finally, a firm
with a experienced worker gets the output y and pays wage and payroll taxes (1 + τ)we(y).
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The firm and worker separate at rate se. Note that filled jobs are discounted at rate r + δ
because when the worker dies the match ends.
To complete the notation for the model let the masses of unemployed inexperienced
workers, unemployed experienced workers, inexperienced matches, experienced matches, in-
experienced vacancies, and experienced vacancies be denoted by un, ue, en, ee, vn, and ve
respectively. We can now define a steady state competitive equilibrium of the model:
Definition 1 A steady state equilibrium consists of the value functions for the worker, Un,
Ue, En(y), and Ee(y), the value functions of the firm, Vn, Ve, Jn(y), Je(y), the aggregate
state variables, un, ue, en, ee, vn, and ve, the wages, wn(y) and we(y), and the reservation
productivity levels for each type of worker, y∗n and y
∗
e such that:
1. Value functions are satisfied: Given wn(y), we(y), un, ue, vn, and ve, Un, Ue, En(y),
Ee(y), Vn, Ve, Jn(y), and Je(y) satisfy equations (1)–(8).
2. Match Formation: Given wn(y), we(y), un, ue, vn, and ve, the reservation productivity
levels y∗n and y
∗
e are optimal decision rules.
3. Free Entry: Given wn(y) and we(y), un, ue, vn, and ve, the value of vacancies must be
Vn = Ve = 0.
4. Bargaining: wn(y) and we(y) satisfy the Nash Bargaining equations:
En(y)− Un = θ[Jn(y) + En(y)− Vn − Un] (9)
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Ee(y)− Ue = θ[Je(y) + Ee(y)− Ve − Ue] (10)
5. Steady State: The following six equations hold:
un + ue + en + ee = 1
(1− γ)pen + seee = λe(1− F (y∗e))ue + δue
λe(1− F (y∗e))ue + pγen = (se + δ)ec
λn(1− F (y∗n))un = (sn + p+ δ)en
qe(1− F (y∗e)) + pδen = (se + δ)ee
qn(1− F (y∗n)) = (sn + p+ δ)en
Where γ = 1−F (y
∗
e )
1−F (y∗n) is the percentage of inexperienced workers who remain employed
when they become experienced.
2.4 Characterizing the Solution
The solution to the model involves solving for the reservation productivity level for each type
of worker. By continuity of the value functions En(y) and Ee(y), the reservation productivi-
ties are defined by the indifference point between unemployment and being employed at the
reservation productivity level. That is, Un = En(y
∗
n) and Ue = Ee(y
∗
e).
Since being experienced is an absorbing state, equations (2), (4), (8), and (10) along
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with the free entry condition can be used to solve for we(y), Ue, Ee(y), Je(y) and y
∗
e . The
reservation property implies that:
(r + δ)Ue = we(y
∗
e)
Imposing free entry, the value function for an entrepreneur matched with an experienced
worker becomes:
Je(y) =
y − (1 + τ)we(y)
r + δ + se
Ee(y) and we(y) are given by the following two equations:
Ee(y) =
we(y) + se
we(y∗e )
r+δ
r + δ + se
(1 + θτ)we(y) = θy + (1− θ)we(y∗e)
The wage equation implies we(y
∗
e) =
y∗e
1+τ
. Using this fact, the reservation productivity solves
the following equation:
y∗e
1 + τ
=
λeθ
(r + δ + se)(1 + θτ)
∫ ∞
y∗e
(y − y∗e)dF (y)
Now, the solution for experienced workers can be used to solve for the reservation pro-
ductivity level of inexperienced workers. The reservation property implies:
wn(y
∗
n) = (r + δ + p)Un − pmax{Ee(y∗n), Ue}
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y∗n is solved for by using the difference between being employed and unemployed when inex-
perienced:
En(y)− Un =
∫ y
y∗n
E ′n(y
′)dy′
Differentiating equation (3) gives an equation for E ′n(y). Since employed workers quit their
jobs when they become experienced unless their productivity is above y∗e , the differentiation
is done in two parts. When y ≥ y∗e :
E ′n(y) =
w′n(y) + p
w′e(y)
r+δ+se
r + δ + p+ sn
When y < y∗e :
E ′n(y) =
w′n(y)
r + δ + p+ sn
Imposing free entry, the value function for entrepreneurs matched with a inexperienced
worker becomes:
Jn(y) =
y − (1 + τ)wn(y) + pIy≥y∗eJe(y)
r + δ + sn + p
Then the wage equation is given by:
(1 + θτ)wn(y) = θy + (1− θ)wn(y∗n)
Note that this equation implies that wn(y
∗
n) =
y∗n
1+τ
.
Since w′e(y) = w
′
n(y) =
θ
1+θτ
, a closed form expression for E ′n(y) is obtained. Note that
for each segment E ′n(y) is a constant. Hence, assuming that y
∗
n < y
∗
e , equation (1) is used to
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solve for y∗n:
r + δ
(r + δ + p)(1 + τ)
[y∗n +
p
r + δ
y∗e ] = λn
∫ ∞
y∗n
En(y)− UndF (y)
=
λnθ
(r + δ + sn + p)(1 + θτ)
[∫ y∗e
y∗n
(y − y∗n)dF (y)
+
∫ ∞
y∗e
(y∗e − y∗n) +
(
1 +
p
r + δ + se
)
(y − y∗e)dF (y)
]
It remains to show that y∗e ≥ y∗n to verify that the above equation gives the correct
solution for y∗n. The proof is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If λe ≥ λn and se < sn, the reservation productivity level of an inexperienced
worker is less than a experienced worker. That is: y∗n < y
∗
e .
Proof.
Proceed by contradiction. Suppose that y∗n ≥ y∗e , then we have:
r + δ
r + δ + p
[y∗n +
p
r + δ
y∗e ] =
λnθ
r + θδ + sn + p
r + δ + se + p
r + δ + se
∫ ∞
y∗n
(y − y∗n)dF (y)
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Recalling the equation that solves y∗e , we get:
y∗n ≤
r + δ
r + δ + p
y∗n +
p
r + δ + p
y∗e
=
λnθ
r + θδ + sn + p
r + δ + se + p
r + δ + se
∫ ∞
y∗n
(y − y∗n)dF (y)
<
λeθ
r + δ + se
∫ ∞
y∗e
(y − y∗e)dF (y)
= y∗e
A contradiction.
The assumption that the job separation rate for experienced workers is lower than for
inexperienced workers is the key factor that generates differences in employment outcomes
between young and old workers. However, the differences in separation rates are filtered
through the worker’s search decisions to generate employment outcomes. Because their jobs
are expected to last longer, experienced workers take longer on average to find new jobs.
The job finding rate for each type of worker, i ∈ {e, n}, is given by λi(1 − F (y∗i )). In the
baseline calibration, λe = λn implies that experienced workers have a lower job finding rate.
This force reduces the differences in employment generated by the decline in the separation
rate, but the rate of employment is still lower for young workers.
2.5 Model with Minimum Wages
This section introduces minimum wages to the model. Minimum wages are introduced as
a binding wage floor in the model, w¯. For a match to form, the wage paid must be equal
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to or exceed this minimum level. As in Flinn (2006), the minimum wage will create a
side condition on the Nash-bargaining problem in the model. This changes the equilibrium
concept that was previous described. In the original model, workers and firms agreed on
match formation. With a wage floor, a worker may want to work at the minimum wage,
w¯, while the firm is unwilling to form a match at this wage. To get around this problem,
the firm now unilaterally chooses whether to form a match when a firm and worker meet.
Hence, the worker no longer makes a maximization decision. Firms solve the same problem
as before.
A second difference in the model with minimum wages concerns Nash bargaining. We
continue to assume Nash bargaining with the added constraint that wi(y) ≥ w¯. This implies
that Ei(y)−Ui ≥ θ[Ji(y) +Ei(y)− V −Ui] for i ∈ {e, n}. The equation holds with equality
if wi(y) > w¯. Under this setup, workers get share θ of the surplus when wi(y) > w¯, but
receive a higher share when the minimum wage binds. Additionally, the wage distribution
has a positive mass at the minimum wage.
Since firms unilaterally make the choice of when to accept a match, the cutoff will be when
y ≥ (1+τ)w¯ as long as the minimum wage is above the original reservation level. For the firm
to be willing to hire a worker at the minimum wage, the worker must be productive enough
to cover the costs of the wage and payroll taxes. The equation shows that payroll taxes
have an interaction with the level of the minimum wages as discussed in Pries and Rogerson
(2005). Higher payroll taxes increase the effective minimum productivity level that a worker
must possess to be hired under any given minimum wage restriction. The values of the
17
minimum wage considered in this paper are only binding for inexperienced workers. Define
y¯n as the productivity level where the original wage function crosses the minimum wage;
that is wn(y¯n) = w¯. y¯n is needed to define the value function for inexperienced vacancies as
it denotes the productivity level where the wage begins to rise above the minimum.
Under a minimum wage, the value function for inexperienced workers becomes:
(r + δ)Un = λn
∫ ∞
(1+τ)w¯
[En(y)− Un] dF (y) (11)
Next, the value function for inexperienced vacancies with a minimum wage is given by
rewriting equation (5) as:
kn =
qn
r + δ + sn + p
[∫ y¯n
(1+τ)w¯
[y − (1 + τ)w¯] dF (y)
+
∫ y∗e
y¯n
[y − (1 + τ)wn(y)] dF (y) +
∫ ∞
y∗e
[y − (1 + τ)wn(y) + pJe(y)] dF (y)
]
If worker productivity is y ∈ [(1 + τ)w¯, y¯n] the wage paid to the worker is the minimum
w¯. For values above y¯n the worker is paid the wage given by unconstrained Nash-bargaining.
These changes mean that a minimum wage has both a direct effect on which jobs will
be available for the worker and an equilibrium effect on the profitability of vacancies in the
economy. The probability that any given contact with a firm will result in a job will go down.
With these changes the model can be solved for employment dynamics given a specified level
of the minimum wage.
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3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match key features of employment and job separation in the
United States. A period in the model corresponds to one month. The discount rate is
r = 0.003, which is equivalent to a 4% annual interest rate. δ determines the rate at which
individuals exit the labor force. Assuming that workers stay an average of 40 years, δ is set
to 1
480
. Finally, labor market policies of minimum wages and taxes are set to the levels in
the United States in the year 2000. Using data from the OECD Minimum Wage database
the minimum wage is set to 36% of the median wage. For taxes, the minimum wage is
interacted with the level of payroll taxes at the minimum wage level. OECD (2006) reports
the payroll tax in the United States at the minimum wage where τ = 0.082 in 2000. Finally,
it is assumed that workers enter the model unemployed and inexperienced. To match the
level of employment in the US for workers aged 15-24, half of the workers enter the workforce
at age 16 and the other half enter at age 17.
The productivity distribution is assumed to be log normal (log y ∼ N(µ, σ2)). As a
normalization, the median of the productivity distribution is set to one. This implies µ = 0.
The value of σ determines the dispersion of productivity and hence wages in the model. For
levels of the minimum wage considered, higher values of dispersion imply that the minimum
wage has a greater effect. σ is set to match the log difference in wages between the 75th and
50th percentile in the data with the same object in the model. Using the IPUMS Dataset
(Ruggles et al. (2009)), the log difference in wages is computed for high school graduates
aged 20-25 who work more than 20 weeks and on average more than 20 hours per week. This
19
sample is selected to observe variation in wages that exclude differences in education and
human capital accumulation not accounted for by the model. With this sample, hourly wages
are constructed by dividing wage income by the number of weeks worked and average weekly
hours. The log difference between the 75th and 50th percentile of wages is approximately
0.3. Using different samples had little effect on the results. σ is chosen in the model to
match this target for the United States. This target yields a value of σ = 0.68.
The separation rates for experienced and inexperienced workers are calibrated to match
those in the US data for individuals at age 18 and 50 respectively. Figure 2 shows separation
rates in the US5. Separation rates decline dramatically with age. For inexperienced workers,
the separation rate is set to sn = 0.248, corresponding to a 16 year old in the US. For
experienced workers the separation rate is set to se = 0.015 which is the level observed for
individuals at age 50.
The rate at which inexperienced employed workers become experienced, p, is set so that
the decline in separation rates match the US economy. The data indicate that at age 27, the
average separation rate is 0.038. This implies that the share of experienced workers at age
27 should be 0.9. Using this target, the rate at which employed workers become experienced
is set to p = 1
36
. An employed worker, on average, becomes experienced after working for
three years. Higher values of p imply that workers become experienced at a faster rate
and hence the employment effects of higher minimum wages have less persistence than for
5This data was constructed by Robert Shimer using CPS monthly microdata from 1976 to 2005. The
procedure used follows Shimer (2005) to create a time-series of separation rates for each age. The reported
values are the average of this time series. For additional details, please see Shimer (2005) and his webpage
http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows.
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Figure 2: Job separation rates in the United States by age and separation rates simulated
from the model.
lower values of p. Little difference exists in the magnitudes of employment effects implied
by different values of p. The profile of separation rates from simulations of the model under
this parameterization are plotted against the US data in Figure 2. The profile is similar to
that found in the US with a sharp decline in the initial years after entering the labor force
and a flat profile later in life.
Matching functions take the standard Cobb-Douglas form, mi(ui, vi) = Aiu
η
i v
1−η
i for
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i ∈ {e, n}. Without loss of generality we set Ai = 1 for i ∈ {e, n}. For any choice of Ai
the values of qi and ki can be chosen to have the same employment dynamics. η is the
same in both value functions. η is set to 0.5. This value is within the range of estimates
found in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and is comparable with the calibration found in
Pries and Rogerson (2005). The Nash bargaining parameter is θ = 0.5. The choice of θ = η
insures that the Hosios (1990) condition applies. This contrasts from Flinn (2006) who varies
the Nash-bargaining parameter to generate potential efficiency gains from higher levels of
minimum wages.
The remaining parameters in the model are the firm’s flow costs for posting each type
of vacancy, kn and ke. Given these costs the matching rates for both workers and firms λn,
λe, qn, and qe are endogenously determined in the model. To pick values for kn and ke, the
matching rates for workers are targeted to be λn = λe = 0.9 for the United States. There
is no direct evidence to use for picking values of λ as job offer rates are not observable in
the data, but the values were chosen so that they were the same across experienced and
inexperienced workers and so that the level of employment would match US levels found
in the data. However, setting λn = λe to values between 0.5 and 1.0 had little effect on
model predictions. This is because job finding rates are determined by the combination of
λ and the worker’s reservation values about which jobs to accept. For the set of parameters
considered in the model, changing the job offer rate has little effect on employment because
workers almost fully adjust which jobs they are willing to accept in response. The targeted
job offer rates imply flow costs of vacancies to be kn = 1.66 and ke = 2.76. The higher value
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of ke compared to kn could be interpreted as finding an experienced worker entails higher
costs to detect the correct skills that fit a particular job. Once kn and ke are set in the initial
calibration, job offer rates, λn and λe, worker arrival rates, qn and qc, and the number of each
type of vacancies, vn and ve all become endogenous variables that will change depending on
changing policy parameters.
Parameter Value Target
µ 0 Normalization
σ 0.68 IPUMS Wage Variation
r 0.003 Annual Interest rate of4%
sn 0.248 16-Year-Old Separation Rate
se 0.015 50-Year-Old Separation Rate
p 1/36 Curvature of Separation Rate by Age
η 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
θ 0.5 Hosios (1990)
kn 1.66 λn = 0.9
ke 2.76 λe = 0.9
Table 1: Calibrated values of the model parameters.
State Quantity
un 0.04
ue 0.14
en 0.07
ee 0.75
Table 2: Steady state results for share of population in each state in the economy.
A summary of the parameter values chosen is presented in Table 1. As an examination
of the effects of these parameter choices, the steady state number of individuals in each state
{un, ue, en, ee} are presented in Table 2. In the model, 82% of people are employed, which
is similar to the aggregate employment to population ratio of the US which is 81% in 2000.
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Figure 3: Average employment rates by age from simulated model.
Also, the table shows that in the stationary distribution of employment outcomes 11% of
workers are inexperienced while 89% are experienced. The employment to population ratio
of inexperienced workers is 62% while it goes up to 84% for experienced workers.
Figure 3 plots the average employment to population ratio by age simulated from the
calibrated model and compares it to the employment to population ratio by age for the same
model where all workers start off experienced. In the model, employment is low for young
workers both because they start off without jobs and because they are inexperienced. The
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figure show that a model without the experience channel can explain some of the low youth
employment, but the convergence to steady state levels of employment occurs extremely
quickly. Including the additional decline in separation rates as workers gain experience
provides a mechanism where the model can generate persistently low employment observed
for young workers.
4 Model predictions
The calibrated model with minimum wage is consistent with many observed patterns of
employment by age. This section describes the predictions of the model for job finding
rates and effects of the minimum wage on employment. The model provides a theoretical
explanation for a variety of empirical findings in the literature.
4.1 Job Finding Rates
One prominent source of heterogeneity is that job finding rates decline with age in the United
States. The model is able to generate an endogenous decline in job finding rates as workers
become experienced. In the model, the observed job finding rate for a worker is given by
the combination of their matching rate λ and the probability that they accept a job from
a new match. For a worker of type i ∈ {e, n}, this probability is given by: λi(1 − F (y∗i )).
Therefore, the fact that y∗n < y
∗
e predicts a decline in job finding rates with age. Figure 4
plots the average job finding rate by age in the United States and the job finding rate by
age simulated from the model. The figure shows that the magnitude of the decline is similar
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in the model and the US, but the model is unable to generate the higher level of job finding
rates found in the US. Part of the reason for this is that the model is calibrated to match
the employment to population ratio in the US while the job finding rates are computed from
the base of unemployed workers. Computing a job finding rate for everyone not currently
employed would lower the finding rate from the data6.
A second implication of the model is that higher levels of the minimum wage drive down
job finding rates for inexperienced workers. Figure 5 plots the job finding rate by age for
the US simulation and the simulation for France with a minimum wage of 0.6 of the median
wage and payroll taxes set to 23%. The figure shows that high levels of the minimum wage
significantly flatten the profile of job finding rates over time. Cohen et al. (1997) compare
job finding rates between the United States and France and find that French job finding
rates are much lower than those in the US. The higher levels of minimum wages in France
can partially explain these observed differences.
4.2 Employment Effects of Minimum Wages
The empirical literature on minimum wages and employment dynamics has looked at direct
employment effects and implications for the wage distribution and future earnings of indi-
viduals who face high minimum wages. The model is consistent with empirical findings that
minimum wages disproportionately harm young workers employment outcomes.
6As a rough adjustment, the job finding rate computed from the data could be multiplied by the percentage
of the population that is unemployed and divided by one minus the employment to population ratio. In
2000, the unemployment rate in the US was 3.9% and the employment to population ratio for workers aged
15-64 was 78.9%. This implies that the job finding rate would be multiplied by 0.18 which moves the lines
closer together. Of course, this calculation ignores large differences in labor force participation by age.
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Figure 4: Average job finding rates in the United States by age and finding rates simulated
from the model.
Figure 6 shows the employment effects of minimum wages simulated from the model.
It shows the average employment to population ratio by age for six different values of the
minimum wage. Minimum wages are calibrated as a percentage of the median wage. The
figure shows that the effects of minimum wages are non-linear. As minimum wages rise, the
employment declines among young workers become more dramatic. The solid line depicts
the average employment rate in the model with minimum wages at 20% of the median. As
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Figure 5: Simulated average job finding rates in the United States and France by age.
the level of the minimum wage rises, the effects of increasing the minimum wage become
larger. Moreover, Figure 6 shows that the effects of a minimum wage are initially large and
die out over time as workers gain experience. Higher levels of the minimum wage generate
greater persistence in employment as it takes workers longer to gain experience.
Figure 7 shows how the results of the model vary for different values of τ . The figure
shows that higher values of payroll taxes do not have large employment effects on their own.
However, it is important to control for the interaction between payroll taxes and minimum
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Figure 6: Average employment by age in model by minimum wage level.
wages as higher payroll taxes directly influence the costs paid by a firm that hires a worker
at the minimum wage.
Results from the model are consistent with the empirical literature that examines the em-
ployment effects of minimum wage regulations. Card and Krueger (1994) stimulated interest
in research on minimum wage by arguing that a minimum wage increase in Pennsylvania
had no adverse impact on employment. Since then, a large body of empirical research has
sought to evaluate the effects of the minimum wage on employment outcomes. For a recent
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Figure 7: Average employment by age in model for various levels of payroll taxes.
survey of the literature see Neumark and Wascher (2007). While there is no consensus on the
overall effect of minimum wages, most studies conclude that minimum wages have slightly
negative employment effects, though often the effects are not statistically significant. While
not a comprehensive review, this section uses the model to help reconcile the major results
from this literature.
First, the model helps explain the failure of some papers to find significant effects of min-
imum wage on employment such as Card and Krueger’s (1994) failure to find any negative
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effects of the minimum wage on employment in the United States. Since minimum wages are
relatively low in the United States and minimum wages have a non-linear effect on employ-
ment, it is unsurprising that small changes in the minimum wage might have insignificant
effects on employment.
Even without a general consensus on the effect of minimum wages on overall employment,
there is a large literature that finds that minimum wages adversely effect employment of
youths. Despite not finding general evidence that minimum wages hurt employment Dolado
et al. (1996) find that minimum wages effect young workers. Using longitudinal data Abowd
et al. (1997) find that young men employed at the minimum wage in both France and the
United States have large decreases in their probability of employment after an increase in
the minimum wage. Differences in total size of employment effects could be a function
of the portion of the population paid at the minimum wage, which is higher in France.
Looking over 17 OECD countries Neumark and Wascher (2004) find that in general minimum
wages cause decreased employment among young workers. The declines are less severe in
countries that have special provisions whereby youths are hired at wages below the minimum.
Moreover, Wessels (2005) finds that minimum wages significantly decrease teenage labor force
participation.
Empirical studies have also focused on France where minimum wages are especially high.
Bazen and Skourias (1997) find a negative effect of minimum wages on youth employment
in France despite finding no significant effects for other groups. Fougere et al. (2000) study
the effects of various youth employment policies in France. They find that subsidies that
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reduce the labor costs of hiring young workers have strong positive effects on increasing
employment. The model is broadly consistent with these empirical findings. It reveals a
mechanism where youth employment outcomes are hurt by increases in the minimum wage
while other segments of the population suffer no adverse employment effect.
4.3 Long-Run Effects
Neumark and Nizalova (2004) document that exposure to high minimum wages at young ages
has long-run effects for employment outcomes. They show that exposure to high minimum
wages implies that workers both work and earn less even into their late 20’s. Moreover, Keane
and Wolpin (1997) show that human capital accumulation while on the job is important to
understanding worker’s labor market decisions and outcomes. Missing skill accumulation
early in life has long run implications for wage growth if the agent is unable to make up for
the lack of skill accumulation while waiting for employment.
The model can account for differences in wage outcomes as experienced workers have a
higher reservation productivity level and earn much higher wages than inexperienced workers.
Workers who are exposed to high minimum wages early in life will have a much lower
probability of becoming employed and experienced. Figure 8 presents the percentage of
people who are experienced by age from the model calibrated with US and French policy
parameters. It shows that under a higher minimum wage a worker is less likely to be
experienced and that these effects can persist for many years. The lower rate of experience
will show up as lower rates of employment and wages later in life.
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Figure 8: Percent of population with experience by age for the model simulated with US and
French parameters.
5 European Employment
A large literature examines the difference in labor market outcomes between the United
States and Europe. Prescott (2004) documented that hours worked has declined dramatically
in Europe relative to the US since the 1970s. Rogerson (2008) decomposes this decline
showing that both hours worked and the employment to population ratio decline since the
mid 1950s. These papers attribute the weaker labor market outcomes to taxes and a weakness
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in the market services sector in Europe respectively.
This section examines the extent to which minimum wages can explain the cross sectional
pattern in employment found in European countries, the United States, and Canada in 2000.
Minimum wages have been declining in real terms in the United States while they have been
increasing in many European countries since the 1970s. This pattern is consistent with the
time series pattern of employment.
5.1 Employment Differences
Using male labor force statistics, the employment to population ratio for each country is
decomposed into age groups revealing that the decline is concentrated in the young (15-24)
and old (55-64) groups. An examination of average outcomes in Canada, France, Portugal,
Spain, and the United States is included. Germany and Italy are excluded, as they do
not have nationally legislated minimum wages. Belgium and the United Kingdom have
special lower minimum wages for young workers that lower the effects of high minimum
wage policies. These special provisions for youth are documented in Funk and Lesch (2006).
For comparability, these countries are excluded although minimum wages turn out to still
have significant employment effects in the United Kingdom and Belgium, especially in later
years.
The labor data used in this paper are obtained from the OECD Corporate Data Envi-
ronment Labor Market Statistics Database. Using the Labor Force Statistics (LFS) by Sex
and Age, series of employment to population ratios are constructed for each age group. The
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data are broken down into five different age groups: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64.
This paper focuses on the large observed differences among the 15-24 year age group while
abstracting from differences among 55-64 year olds that are likely explained by differences
in retirement and unemployment insurance policies.
Country 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Canada 56.2 80.2 81.3 77.7 48.1
France 23.2 76.3 80.1 78.3 34.3
Portugal 42.0 83.9 84.0 76.8 50.8
Spain 36.3 70.2 70.8 62.8 37.0
US 59.7 81.5 82.2 80.5 57.8
Table 3: Average employment to population ratio by age band in 2000.
Decomposing the employment to population ratio into age bands reveals that the differ-
ences in employment outcomes are concentrated in the 15-24 year age group. Table 3 shows
the average employment to population ratios by age group of five countries in 2000 that
were plotted in Figure 1. The table shows that all countries except Spain have remarkably
consistent employment to population ratios for male workers aged 25-54 with employment
to population ratios around 80%. The largest difference among age groups is found in the
youngest (aged 15-24) workers. The age pattern documented is consistent with that shown
in Rogerson (2006) for Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy in 2000. This pattern implies
that young workers being out of employment is a primary cause for differences in European
employment relative to the US.
To explain the relative decline in European employment, it is important to understand the
differences in employment for young workers. While a large literature has tried to understand
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the total decline in hours worked, few have examined differences by age. This section explores
how much of the differences in employment for young workers can be explained by differences
in minimum wages across countries.
5.2 Minimum Wages
Minimum wages vary dramatically across countries. However, there is no standard measure
for comparing minimum wage levels. To calibrate the model, the ratio of the minimum wage
to the median is used. This measure controls for differences in wage levels to account for how
binding the minimum wage levels are in each country. Countries that have high productivity
and pay high wages can sustain higher absolute levels of the minimum before the minimum
wage policy will cut into the distribution of accepted jobs. To understand how minimum
wages vary across countries that are considered, three different measures of minimum wages
are presented in Table 4: the hourly minimum wage, the ratio of the minimum to the median
wage, and the percentage of workers who earn the minimum. The percentage of full-time
employees who are paid the minimum wage provides evidence of how binding the minimum
wage is across countries. Data on minimum wages come from three sources. First, OECD
(2006) present info on the hourly minimum wage in 2000. Second, the OECD Minimum
Wage Database has data on the level of the minimum wage with respect to the median
wage. The US, Spain, and Canada have low minimum wages relative to the median and
low percentages of the workers earn the minimum while Portugal and France have higher
minimum wage ratios. Portugal is interesting because it has the lowest hourly minimum wage
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Country Hourly Min Wage Ratio of Min to Median % Earning Minimum
Canada $6.77 0.41 NA
France $8.80 0.60 14.0
Portugal $3.22 0.47 4.0
Spain $4.28 0.37 0.8
US $6.08 0.36 1.5
Table 4: Hourly minimum wages in 2000 in US dollars at 2006 prices, ratio of the minimum
wage to the median wage in 2000, and percent of full-time employees earning the minimum
wage in 2002.
but the ratio to the median is fairly high. Finally, in a EuroStat Statistics in Focus handout,
Paternoster (2004) presents the percentage of the population that is paid the minimum wage
in 2002 in all countries under consideration except Canada. Spain and the US have very few
workers who earn the minimum wage, in Portugal 4% earn the minimum, but in France 14%
earn the minimum.
5.3 Quantitative Results
This section quantitatively assesses the impact of changing minimum wage and payroll tax
levels to those found in each country. This policy experiment gives a quantitative answer
to how US employment patterns would change by adopting minimum wage and payroll
tax policies of each country holding all other labor market policies fixed. By simulating
employment outcomes for each set of policy variables, the model can be used to calculate
how much of observed differences in youth employment outcomes are explained by differences
in minimum wages.
For a given ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage in each country, the model
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is used to compute job finding rates for inexperienced and experienced workers and the
probability that a worker quits when she becomes experienced. These three numbers along
with the calibrated separation rates for inexperienced and experienced workers are used to
simulate the model in continuous time. From the continuous time simulation, the worker’s
employment status and experience are recorded at the end of each model period. This corre-
sponds to monthly employment data. Employment outcomes for each worker are recorded for
40 years of data. For each specification, the model simulated for 10,000 individual outcomes
so that the average employment and experience rates can be computed for each month from
the time that a worker enters the labor force. These data are then aggregated into yearly
data by age to be comparable with OECD statistics.
To match the data, averages for 10-year age bands are computed from the simulated data.
Figure 9 shows the simulated results for the US plotted against the data. It shows that the
model does a good job of matching the US level of youth employment and the transition
into prime aged employment levels. The model has no feature to account for declines in
employment levels in later life, so the predicted employment is slightly higher than observed
for workers aged 45-54.
Country 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54
Canada 55.1 75.3 81.9 83.3
France 40.4 70.9 79.6 82.5
Portugal 52.3 77.5 81.0 83.1
Spain 57.3 76.8 82.3 83.2
US 58.8 77.3 82.7 83.4
Table 5: Average employment to population ratio simulated from the model.
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Figure 9: Simulated results for the US compared to the data.
Table 5 reports the employment to population ratios for each age band from the model
with minimum wages and payroll taxes set to the level of each country. The qualitative
features of the model are similar to those found in the data. Patterns in the data for countries
are similar to the data in that there are not large differences for prime aged employment while
differences in minimum wages and taxes manifest themselves in lower levels of employment
for young workers.
To get a better sense of how much the model is able to explain, the data from each country
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Figure 10: Simulated effects of differences in minimum wages plotted against data from each
country.
are plotted against baseline model predictions of the US and the model predictions for the
levels of minimum wages and payroll taxes found in that country in Figure 10. For Canada,
France, and Portugal the model can account for a significant portion of the difference in youth
employment outcomes from the US. For Canada, neither the labor market policies nor the
employment outcomes differ much from the US. In this case, the model slightly over predicts
the observed differences. This is not that surprising as there is not much variation to be
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accounted for. France and Portugal both have significantly lower levels of youth employment
than the United States. In both cases, varying minimum wages and payroll taxes allows the
model to generate about half of the employment differences for young workers. The exercise
shows that minimum wages are a significant factor in explaining employment outcomes in
countries with high levels of minimum wages. The predicted outcomes for prime aged workers
are similar to those viewed in the data.
Spain is an interesting outlier to both the patterns in the data and outcomes of the model.
First, prime aged workers in Spain work at a much lower rate than those in all of the other
countries. By decomposing employment to population ratio by sex, prime aged males work
at a similar rate to those in the US while female employment is much lower. Given this
shift down due to lower female participation, the age employment profile is nearly the same
shape as found in the US. Moreover, Spain is a good example of a country with low levels
of minimum wages and payroll taxes. Since minimum wages are not that binding the model
predicts that other factors would dominate employment outcomes.
To get a better sense of how well the model is able to predict the data, Figure 11 plots
the simulated model results for each age band against the data. If the model and data fit
perfectly, each point should lie on the 45-degree line. The figure shows that for most of the
countries the model fits well. The points that are farthest from the 45 degree line are the 15-
24 year old points for France and Portugal, where the model over-predicts the employment
rates (it only can account for about half of the observed decline in employment for young
workers in these countries compared to the US). Also, the model over-predicts employment
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Figure 11: Simulated model result for each age band plotted against the data.
for all ages in Spain due to differences in employment among females across countries. For
the remainder of the points, the model and data are very close.
Despite not including many factors that could influence employment differences across
countries, the model shows that minimum wages can play a significant role in explaining
differences in youth employment between the United States and European countries that
have high minimum wage regulations. These results are also obtained in a framework that
holds job separation rates fixed for experienced and inexperienced workers in the model.
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A second potential weakness with the simulation strategy is dealing with educational
differences across countries. If higher minimum wages decreased employment and increased
educational attainment it could change the interpretation of the results. The model attempts
to explain patterns of employment, but doesn’t include educational choices. Neumark and
Wascher (2003) empirically evaluate the effect of minimum wage on school enrollments and
find that increases in the minimum wage decreases enrollment. Higher minimum wages
decrease both the number of young people in school and the number who work.
Minimum wages decreasing the level of youth employment does not rule out other expla-
nations for lower levels of European employment. Understanding these differences requires
explanations that can explain the age pattern of employment differences found in the data.
Minimum wages are a promising candidate to explain differences in youth employment. It
should also be noted that this paper examines only differences in employment to popula-
tion ratios where Prescott (2004) documents that average annual hours of work per person
in employment is also much lower in Europe. Evidence on hours worked is not available
by age, which makes it difficult to evaluate the total effects of the model. Complimentary
explanations for lower levels of European employment include tax policies and structural
change offered by Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2008). Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (1998)
explanation that lost human capital when unemployed along with high levels of unemploy-
ment insurance cause longer unemployment durations in Europe is a plausible candidate to
explain the lower rates of employment among older workers who have acquired large stocks
of human capital, but will be unable to account for differences in youth employment.
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6 Conclusion
Much of the macro labor literature has focused on representative agent models that abstract
from differences in labor market decisions over an individual’s life cycle. This paper extends
standard search models to feature a worker’s experience in the labor market. Experience
gives workers a lower rate of job separations. This model allows differences in employment
outcomes to be considered by age, since older workers are more likely to be experienced.
Examining the model with minimum wages provides a theoretical foundation for empirical
findings on the effects of minimum wages and an ability to evaluate the effects of minimum
wages on youth employment outcomes across countries. The model is consistent with many
of the empirical findings on the effects of minimum wages. Minimum wages decrease youth
employment while having a small effect on prime aged employment outcomes. Also, the
model predicts minimum wages to have non-linear effects on employment, which helps explain
why empirical studies have found very small effects of minimum wages in the US but greater
effects in other countries.
The relative decline in European youth employment is a significant feature in the discrep-
ancy of labor market outcomes between Europe and the United States. Understanding why
Europeans work less than Americans must include an explanation of the large differences
in the age patterns of work across countries. The model matches the decline of European
employment relative to the United States in that there is little difference in employment
outcomes for prime aged workers.
The findings in this paper should be viewed as complimentary to other explanations for
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the decline in European employment. This paper documents that minimum wages have a
significant effect on youth employment outcomes. Other policies that have been studied such
as differences in taxes and technology certainly play a role in accounting for overall differences
in hours worked across countries. To completely understand differences in employment it is
important to understand how these institutions interact to influence employment outcomes.
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Appendix
A Employment Time Series
This section connects the initial plot of cross country employment in 2000 to the time
series evidence on employment to population ratios by age for Canada, France, Portugal,
Spain, and the United States. The OECD Corporate Data Environment Labor Market
Statistics Database is used to construct employment to population ratios by ten year age
band. Unfortunately, when breaking down the employment data by age, only limited time
series evidence is available for many countries. Moreover, average hours worked are not
available by age group. Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006) emphasize that employment
differences across countries occurs both in differences in average employment to population
ratios and average annual hours worked per employed worker. However, it is likely that the
younger and older workers who show most of the decline in employment are also more likely
to be part time workers than those in prime ages.
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Figure 12: Employment to population ratio for 15-24 year olds over time.
Figure 12 show the employment to population ratio for young workers plotted from
1960-2004. The graph plots the HP Filtered trend of employment to population ratio with
smoothing parameter set to 100 for the total (male and female) population. Over this time,
youth employment in the United States is fairly stable. The graph shows a slight increase
until 1990 with a slight decline in employment after. This contrasts with the sharp decline
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in employment for over time in France, Portugal and Spain. Canada’ pattern of youth
employment is similar to the United States. The striking decline in European employment
motivates a large literature to explain the differences between the United States and Europe.
The differences in employment for the young group shown in the introduction of the paper
are the outcome of these longer time trends.
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Figure 13: Employment to population ratio over time for different age groups.
Figure 13 shows the time series of the HP trend employment to population ratios for the
four other age groups. The results are also consistent with the introduction. For the 25-34,
35-44, and 45-54 year old groups, the employment patterns in all countries except Spain are
remarkably similar. Restricting the data to only males would bring the results from Spain
more in line with the rest of the countries. Moreover, the upward trend in employment over
the period for these prime aged groups is due to increased employment among females during
the period. The bottom right panel shows the time series for workers aged 55-64. Again this
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figure shows declines in employment for all a countries starting around 1970. While the US
employment remains fairly stable and recovers in the 1990s, France and Spain sustain much
larger declines while Canada and Portugal are in between the two extremes.
It is interesting to compare the timing of the decline of 55-64 year old workers with the 15-
24 age group. Rogerson (2006) emphasizes that looking at employment generates declines
in Europe starting in the 1960s while looking at unemployment data points to European
divergence starting in the 1970s. While the time series is not long enough to present a clear
picture, breaking down the data by age indicate that declines in youth employment were
much more severe in the 1970s while the declines among the older group were concentrated
in the 1980s. Part of the explanation to reconcile these results could be that older workers
who do not work are more likely to show up as unemployed while younger workers may drop
out of the labor force. This would allow employment to decline starting earlier as youth
employment declines while the spike in unemployment happens later when older workers
employment drops.
B Unemployment vs. Labor Force Participation
This paper uses employment to population ratios to evaluate cross-country labor market
outcomes. Another standard measure is to look at unemployment rates. Looking at unem-
ployment rates gives a slightly different picture, but the main findings are still apparent.
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Figure 14: Unemployment rate and labor force participation rate by age in 200o.
Figure 14 plots both the unemployment rate and labor force participation rate by age
group for the year 2000. Both the unemployment and labor force margin are active. The
unemployment graph shows that unemployment is higher for young workers and the cross
country differences are larger. The difference is that there are still noticeable differences in
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the unemployment rate across countries for prime aged workers. The cross country differ-
ences grow slightly for 55-64 year old workers. The plot of labor force participation closely
resembles that for the employment to population ratio. There are significant cross country
differences for 15-24 and 55-64 year old workers while prime aged workers participate at
similar levels for all countries besides Spain.
Using employment to population ratios gives a more complete analysis of the effect of
labor market policies on individual work behavior as some policies can also incentivize work-
ers to remain in the labor market. The employment to population ratio captures both the
unemployment and labor force participation margins of workers out of employment.
C Minimum Wage Time Series
There is mixed evidence on how changing minimum wages over time is able to account
for changes in youth employment. Dolado et al. (1996) suggests that minimum wages are
unlikely to account for large changes in employment over time in Europe as they have not
increased dramatically in most countries and because many countries have separate minimum
wages for young workers. For a detailed description of these policies see Funk and Lesch
(2006). The results in this paper challenge those findings by showing that high levels of
the minimum wage can explain large portions of employment differences for young workers
across countries.
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Figure 15: Ratio of minimum wage to minimum wage in each country over time.
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To evaluate the time series evidence, Figure 15 plots the ratio of the minimum wage to
the median wage over time. The data is the HP trend with a smoothing parameter of 100.
This ratio is a plausible measure of how binding a given level of minimum wages are in each
country. The two potential issues to evaluate are the level of plot and the time trend. The
levels show that European countries have had consistently higher minimum wages than the
United States over this period with the exception of France who started with a lower level.
The time trends point to declining importance of minimum wages in all countries besides
France. France is the one exception where minimum wages rise consistently since 1960 from
a level of about 40% of the median wage to about 60% of the median. The graph shows that
while the minimum wage might not be the driving force for trends in employment for all
countries it has the potential to explain a large portion of the difference in youth employment
between France and the United States between 1960 and 2000. This is important as France
has the worst youth employment outcomes of any of the countries considered in this study.
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